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SMITH V. CITY OF SALEM, OHIO
378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004)
FACTS
Jimmie L. Smith is a seven year veteran lieutenant in the Salem Fire
Department (SFD). 1 Smith, biologically and by birth a male, is a
transitioning preoperative transsexual recently diagnosed with Gender
Identity Disorder (GID).2 After being diagnosed with GID, Smith followed
international medical protocols for treating GID by expressing a more
feminine appearance on a full time basis.3 As a result, Smith's co-workers
commented and questioned him regarding his appearance and mannerisms,
stating that he was not masculine enough.4
Smith brought his concerns to his immediate supervisor, Thomas
Eastek, and informed him of his GID treatments and his eventual complete
physical transformation from male to female. Smith also specifically asked
Eastek not to reveal the substance of their conversation to any of his
superiors, and in particular the Chief of the SFD, Walter Greenamyer.6
Eastek, however, did divulge his conversation with Smith to Greenamyer.7
Shortly thereafter, Greenamyer met with the Law Director for the
City of Salem (City), C. Brooke Zellers, with the intention of terminating
Smith's employment on the basis of Smith's transsexualism. 8 On April 18,
2001, Greenamyer and Zellers arranged a meeting of the City's executive
body to devise a plan to terminate Smith's employment.9 They agreed to
require Smith to take three psychological evaluations with physicians of the
City's choosing, hoping that Smith would either resign or refuse to comply,
in which case they would terminate Smith on the ground of
insubordination. 1 0 The executive body did not follow state employment
termination procedures. 1
A city official present at the meeting informed Smith of the plan
after the meeting, calling the city's plan a "witch hunt.' 2 Smith's counsel
Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2004).
2 Id. GID has been characterized by the American Psychiatric Association as a disjunction
between an individual's sexual organs and sexual identity. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 576-82 (4th ed. 2000).







10 Id. at 569.
" Id. at 568-69. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(G) (2004)) (detailing procedures that
municipal officers need to abide by when taking employment action against a municipal employee).
12 Id. at 569.
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called the city two days later to advise and warn it of the potential legal
consequences that could result if the City followed through with the plan
discussed at the meeting.1 3 On April 22, 2001, Smith obtained a "right to
sue" letter from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
14
Four days later Greenamyer suspended Smith for a 24 hour shift for an
infraction of a "City and/or Fire Department policy.' ' 5 Smith contended the
suspension was the result of selective enforcement in retaliation for his
retention of counsel at a hearing before the Salem Civil Service
Commission.' 6 During his seven year employment with the SFD, Smith has
never had any negative incidents prior to the events in this case. 17 Smith was
not allowed to call witnesses and enter any testimony in regards to the April
18, 2001 meeting, contravening Ohio law. 18 The Commission upheld
Smith's suspension and Smith appealed to the County Court of Common
Pleas, which reversed the suspension. 19
Smith filed suit in federal district court, asserting Title VII claims of
sex discrimination and retaliation, and claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.20
The district court dismissed the federal claims and granted judgment on the
pleadings for the Defendants.2' Smith appealed, claiming that the federal
court erred in holding that 1) he failed to state a claim of sex stereotyping; 2)
Title VII protection is not available for transsexuals; 3) he failed to
demonstrate he had suffered from an adverse employment action; and 4) he
failed to state a claim based on a deprivation of a constitutional or federal
statutory right.22
HOLDING
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Smith was able to
establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII. 23
The Court found that Smith was able to show 1) sex stereotyping had






18 Id. (citing OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 124-9-11 (2004)) (permitting the introduction of evidence of
disparate treatment and selective enforcement).
19 Id.
20 Id. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996) creates a cause of action for a person whose rights are violated by
anyone acting under color of state authority.
21 Smith, 378 F.3d at 569.
22 Id. at 569-70.
23 Id. at 578.
24 Id. at 572-73.
25 Id. at 574-75
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suspension was an adverse employment action;26 and 4) although the Equal
Protection Clause was never specifically mentioned in the complaint, the
case for sex discrimination is so obviously grounded in the Equal Protection
Clause that the defendants had fair notice of it.
27
ANALYSIS
The Court first analyzed Smith's Title VII claims. 28 To establish a
primafacie case for employment discrimination, the plaintiff must show that:
1) he is a member of a protected class; 2) he suffered an adverse employment
action; 3) he was qualified for the position; and 4) he was treated differently
from other similarly situated individuals outside his protected class.29 Smith,
as a male, was a member of a protected class, had suffered an adverse
employment action when he was suspended without pay for a 24 hour period,
was fully qualified to work at the SFD, and was treated differently merely
because of a change in his behavior.30 Thus, Smith made out a prima facie
case of employment discrimination.31
In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII,
the plaintiff must show that: 1) he engaged in an activity protected by Title
VII; 2) the defendant knew the plaintiff was engaged in such activity; 3) the
defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and 4)
there was a causal connection between the activity and the adverse action.32
Smith suffered an adverse employment action in the form of his 24
hour suspension, which occurred after he pursued legal remedies by
obtaining his "right to sue" letter.33 The adverse employment action would
not have happened but for his change in behavior, and the Court noted that
the proximity in time between his obtainment of the "right to sue" letter and




Turning its attention to the issues on appeal, the Court first addressed
the issue of sex stereotyping, employing the standard articulated by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.35 The Court compared the
26 Id. at 576.
27 Id. at 577.
28 Id. at 570.
29 Id. (citing Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 597, 601 (6th Cir. 2000)).
30 Id. at 570.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 577 (citing Dicarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 420 (6th Cir. 2004)).
33 Id. at 570-71.
3 Id. (citing Miller v. Fairchild Indus. Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1986)).
35 Id. at 571. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that sex
stereotyping is impermissible under Title VII). In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court considered a
case that involved the denial of partnership to a female employee because she was perceived as too
masculine. Id. at 231-32. The Price Waterhouse Court considered evidence that showed the excellent
2005]
Wash. & Lee. Race & Ethnic Anc. L.J.
facts in the case to the facts in Price Waterhouse, stating that the sex
stereotyping of a female senior manager as too "macho" was directly
analogous to the stereotyping of a firefighter as too "feminine.
'' 6
The Court found that the district court erred by relying on pre-Price
Waterhouse cases from other federal appellate courts which held that
transsexuals were not a protected class, as discrimination was based on
"gender" rather than "sex, 3 7 using "gender" to refer to societal, behavioral
norms as opposed to "sex," which refer to biological differences between
men and women.38 The reasoning in Price Waterhouse should have applied,
as the Supreme Court had established that Title VII's reference to sex
encompassed both biological and stereotypical differences.39 The Court
found that the tyj7e of sex stereotyping found in this case was impermissible
under Title VII.
As to the adverse employment claim, the Court found that an adverse
employment action had occurred when the SFD suspended Smith for a 24
hour shift. 41 The Court reasoned that as Smith's 24 hour shift was the
equivalent to three eight-hour days for an ordinary worker, his suspension
cost him 60% of his work week in lost wages.42 The Court held irrelevant
whether Smith's suspension was ultimately reversed by the Court of
Common Appeals, as an adverse employment action (which does not require
a negative effect or repercussion to the claimant) is not the same as a
negative employment action.43
Finally, the Court addressed the issue of whether or not Smith failed
to state a claim based on the deprivation of a constitutional or federal
statutory right.44 The Court noted that Smith had stated a claim for relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in connection with his sex-based claim of
employment discrimination but never referenced the Equal Protection Clause
performance of the employee and that none of the other candidates for partnership that year had similar
performance. Id. at 233-34. The employee was subject to comments that showed sex stereotyping, and
she claimed that she was denied partnership because her behavior did not match up with some of the
partnership's pre-conceived notions of gender. Id. at 234-36. The Price Waterhouse Court plurality
opinion held that sex stereotyping is impermissible under Title VII, and the partnership had used sex
stereotyping in considering her for partnership. Id. at 251.
36 Smith, 378 F.3d at 571-2 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235).
37 Id. at 572. See also Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that a
transsexual pilot was not protected under Title VII because Congress never intended to include
transsexuals under the definition of "sex").
38 Smith, 378 F.3d at 573.
39 Id. (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251).
40 Id. at 575.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 576.
43 Id. (citing White v. Burlington Northern & Sante Fe Ry. Co., 310 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2002)).
" Id.
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specifically.45 The Court noted the liberal standards of notice pleading and
held that no specific reference to the Equal Protection Clause was required
because Smith's claims were supported by facts that easily constituted a sex
discrimination case.46 The connection to the Equal Protection Clause was
apparent to all.41
Addressing a secondary issue brought by Smith in his appellate brief,
the Court held that Smith failed to state a claim based on his right to due
process.4 8 The Court stated that State law cannot by itself be the basis for a
federal constitutional violation, and Smith's complaint never specified what
deprivation of property or liberty was implicated by the City's failure to




In a world of rapidly changing societal norms and the gradual
breakdown of gender stereotypes, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
recognized the need to protect under Title VH all people who may be
suffering from invidious sex discrimination.5 If Title VII does not protect
transsexuals, the reasoning in Price Waterhouse would be meaningless to
protect those who wished to transcend sex stereotypes and classic gender
identifications.5'
There has been a gradual shift in recent years toward more legal
protections of transsexuals and those who wish to transcend traditional sex
52stereotypes. Traditionally this has not been the case, as pointed out by the
Court in its discussion of pre-Price Waterhouse case law which usually held
that the term "sex" was never considered to include transsexuals by
45 Id. at 576-67 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996)).
Id. at 577. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1).
47 Id.
4 Id. at 578.
49 Id. at 578. See Purisch v. Tenn. Tech. Univ., 76 F.3d 1414, 1423 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that
a violation of a university's employment grievance procedure by the administration does not by itself
implicate federal constitutional due process).
50 Smith, 378 F.3d at 575.
51 Id. at 574-75.
52 See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying protections of the Gender
Motivated Violence Act to transsexuals); EEOC v. Grief Bros. Corp., No. 02-CV-468S, 2004 WL
2202641, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004) (denying summary judgment in a case where plaintiff alleged
sexual harassment because he was gay).
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Congress.53 Even today, there are cases where courts will not recognize that
sex stereotyping is occurring.54
Gender Identity Disorder is a mental disorder recognized by the
American Psychiatric Association.5 As such, the Court may have viewed
Smith as only following international medical protocols in his treatment of
his disorder, and to be punished for that would have been unjust in its eyes.
This may be an unfair assessment of transsexuals, as some do not believe
transsexualism is a disorder at all. Still, the Court's unanimous holding
seems to include not only transsexual and transgendered people, but also
seems to strengthen Price Waterhouse's reasoning to strike against all types
of sex stereotyping.56 The Court seems to have expanded Price Waterhouse
to such an extent that any type of sex stereotyping could lead to a right of
action. This may have been done in the interests of justice because of the
lack of a right of action under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990."7
Only time will tell if such a broad treatment can survive.
Title VII was written to protect people from the debilitating effects
of discrimination. The decision in this case follows the standard of Price
Waterhouse and helps to eliminate out-of-date gender classifications and
preserve liberty of self-identity in our 21st Century world.
Summary and Analysis By:
Johnny Lo
53 Smith, 378 F.3d at 572-73.
S See Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that an
employer policy requiring female bartenders to wear makeup is a legitimate grooming standard, not sex
stereotyping).
5 Smith, 378 F.3d at 568.
5 id. at 572-75.
57 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b) (1990) ("Under this chapter,
the term 'disability' shall not include - (1) transvestism, transsexualism... ").
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